by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
On Friday
afternoon, the arms
trade treaty (ATT) negotiation conference closed without adopting a treaty.
During the morning plenary, the United States, followed by Cuba, DPRK, Russia, and
Venezuela, declared that negotiations needed to be extended. Thus the six year
process to develop an ATT failed to achieve its goal. Furthermore, the draft
treaty that would have been adopted was much weaker than the one envisaged
by those who initiated the process in the first place. And so while this
particular course has ended without a treaty, it is by no means the end of the
road for an ATT altogether. The discussions over the past month have further demonstrated
the need to develop such a treaty, and the need to do though a non-consensus
based process.
Yet the
countries standing against adoption of the treaty were the vast minority. 90
countries delivered a joint
statement on Friday expressing their disappointment. These countries, which
included several of the major arms exporters such as Germany and France, indicated
that the draft treaty developed by the conference had “the overwhelming support
of the international community as a base for carrying forward our work.”
However, as the ATT Monitor
repeatedly pointed out (e.g. No.
17 and No.
18), the draft ATT had significant loopholes that would have undermined its
ability to truly diminish human suffering as a result of the irresponsible arms
trade. Thus not only did the consensus-based process fail to result in any
treaty, but it had already extended negotiations to the point where the treaty
on the table did not actually establish the highest possible common standards
for regulating international arms transfers.
The United
States recognized this problem from the outset, which is ostensibly why it
voted against the 2008
UN General Assembly resolution establishing an open-ended working group on
the ATT. In an explanation
of vote, the US delegation argued, “Any ATT would require the support of the
major arms exporters to be effective, and we believe that some major arms
exporters would refuse to agree to an ATT that required meaningful, effective
conventional arms transfer controls policies. The only way to convince all
major arms exporters to sign on to the ATT would be to weaken its provisions.”
This is, of course, exactly what happened throughout the July negotiations, as
the draft texts became weaker and weaker in order to accommodate the demands of
the USA, Russia, and China, as well as major importers such as India.
In this same
explanation of vote, the US delegation also recognized that “[c]oncluding
a weak ATT would legitimise an international standard based on a lowest common
denominator that would not address the problem of illicit and irresponsible
arms transfers.” By Friday, this indeed was in danger of happening, due to the
refusal of the USA and other major exporters to accept high standards. The
draft treaty did not set the highest standards and its weak provisions could
indeed have legitimized irresponsible transfers, providing legal cover to those
wanting to put priorities of profits and politics above human lives, justice,
and dignity.
There is
perhaps further irony in the fact that the decision to conduct the ATT
negotiating conference on the basis of consensus was made in order to bring the
US government on board. Even back in 2009, when the UN General Assembly adopted
resolution
64/48 to begin the negotiating process, many governments recognized the potential
problems with operating by consensus. Among others, the delegations of Austria,
Germany,
Ireland, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal,
and Switzerland expressed concern with the consensus rule. The Norwegian
delegation argued, “We are concerned that the requirement of consensus could
negatively affect the negotiations and reduce the quality of the outcome.
Deciding that all states have the right to veto and block the end result from
the outset of a negotiating process will seriously undermine the credibility of
the process.”
These predictions were accurate. Most of the
major exporters, along with several countries concerned that the treaty would
be applied with discrimination against their governments, rigorously opposed
strong criteria and comprehensive scope, and fought to ensure the text
incorporated several major loopholes to undermine the treaty’s implementation.
On the other hand, at least 74 governments
were opposed to the weak texts being placed before them. In joint statements on
20
July and 26
July these countries demanded a strong treaty to prevent the
authorization of transfers of conventional arms where there is a substantial
risk that those weapons would be used for, or facilitate, serious violations of
international law, including international human rights law and international
humanitarian law, or that they will be diverted to the illicit market and to
unauthorized end-users.
Thus
the rule of consensus allowed the view of the minority—those states with
political or economic concerns about regulating the international arms trade—to
win the day. In a statement
following the conference, the Mexican government reiterated its displeasure
with the consensus rule, which “makes it impossible to reach agreements when
there is broad and clear support, which is nullified by the opposition of a
minority of states”.
However,
they are indeed a minority. And while they might have won the day, they
certainly have not won altogether. While the consensus-based process produced a
weak treaty that could not be adopted in spite of its minimal standards and its
overriding loopholes, the process also demonstrated that the majority of countries
do in fact want a strong treaty that would actually make a difference in the
lives of those suffering from armed violence. There were many more countries
fighting for a strong treaty than there were fighting to undermine it. There
were also many more countries demanding the treaty prevent gender-based
violence (GBV) than there were arguing against this. While the Holy See said
only two states supported GBV while 20 were against it, in fact, 75
countries supported the inclusion of GBV in the treaty.
The
ATT process demonstrated that there is already an overwhelming norm against
transferring arms when there is a risk of violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law, including acts of gender-based violence. It is
this norm that must be built upon in the future and codified into international
law through a process working with normal UN rules such as a two-thirds majority
vote.
After the
conference’s failure on Friday, UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon said, “I am encouraged that this is not the end of the ATT, and
that States have agreed to continue pursuing this noble goal.” The 74 countries
that came together during the negotiation conference must continue
to work for a strong treaty, perhaps by developing a strong draft for
consideration at this year’s UN General Assembly. The draft treaty currently on
the table is insufficient to close the gaps in the international arms trade,
but a stronger treaty would go a long way towards diminishing the violent
consequences of this trade.
That
said, an ATT cannot stand on its own to end the consequences of armed violence.
Only a cessation of reliance on weapons for security can do this. As Dr. Robert
Zuber of Global Action to Prevent War argues in another piece in this edition,
“Our hope for an ATT
is that it provides new opportunities to stigmatize the staggering arms trade,
not to provide new impetus for its growth.” Since the beginning of the ATT
process, WILPF has argued that a strong ATT can help build the foundations for not just the
regulation but also the reduction of
the arms trade, along with the reduction of militarism throughout politics and
society, reduction of military spending, and redirection of economic resources. As we pause for reflection
in the process to develop an ATT, we should keep this nobler goal in mind.
