by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War
States have continuously called for a
transparent and open negotiating process for the arms
trade treaty (ATT), noting the importance of openness while deliberating
treaty language. While transparency in negotiation is important, promoting
consistent and robust transparency in the full ATT architecture is equally
essential. Furthermore, robust transparency in implementing treaty obligations
is necessary in order to ensure that the ATT will provide for a ‘value-added’ to
already existing mechanisms under UN auspices.
As noted by the delegation of Senegal
during the plenary session on Monday morning, the ATT must take into account
existing processes, such as the UN Programme
of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA); the women, peace, and security
framework as laid forth in UN
Security Council Resolution 1325; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) programmes. This ‘value-added’ of the ATT rests, in part, on its legally-binding
nature, especially when the treaty is understood as complementary to the UNPoA
political (non-legally binding) framework on illicit trade in small arms. If
there is not sufficient transparency in ATT obligations, there is a danger that
the ATT will become just another ‘framework’ and not fulfill its legally-binding
role in complementing other UN processes.
It is important to bear in mind the significance
of adopting an ATT that meaningfully contributes value to the existing set of
multilateral instruments with particular emphasis on robust transparency
measures. During Monday morning’s plenary meeting, some states referred to the
need for transparency and accountability under the ATT, but with the additional
caveat that relevant transparency measures must strike an “appropriate balance
between transparency and national security.” The representative
of China explicitly stated, “Clean-cut transparency measures may not suit
all.” Likewise, the representative of Belarus
agreed that transparency measures must take into account national commercial
and security interests. While mindful of the national security dimension,
advocating for transparency measures with “strings attached” represents a
dangerous potential for undermining the meaningfulness of the ATT by providing
potential political cover for future dubious transfers; in essence leaving room
for states parties to maintain that national interests or circumstances
“prevent them” from remaining fully transparent. While consideration for
national security should be incorporated into any multilateral agreement, it
cannot and should not be used as a means of diversion from fulfilling ATT
obligations. The ATT’s legally-binding status necessitates the highest levels
of accountability.
The position that the ATT
“should be a confidence-building mechanism and not a sanction mechanism,” as
expressed by the delegation of Indonesia, is not sufficient. As previously
noted, the ATT must be much more than a confidence-building measure by virtue
of its legally-binding status. Transparency in ATT obligations, most especially
in transfer authorizations and denials, is not merely a confidence-building
measure, but constitutes a legal obligation. In this context, the
complementarity between the UNPoA and the ATT underscores the importance of
adopting an ATT with strong and transparent obligations. The
ATT provides the opportunity to address the lack of accountability in the UNPoA
process by dictating, in a legally-binding manner, how states signatories must
comply with international transfer standards with a high level of transparency through
a clear reporting process on transfers (including denials) and a formal,
mandatory monitoring system. Furthermore, in concert with the UNPoA that
provides a framework for drying up stockpiles and eliminating weapons in
circulation, the ATT has the opportunity to curb human suffering and armed
violence that could be caused by new instances of diverted trade in
conventional weapons.
While
the UNPoA provides an important framework for implementing adequate national laws,
regulations, and administrative procedures around illicit trade in small arms,
the ATT must not become another political document offering only general
guidelines for arms transfer authorizations. The opportunity to craft and adopt
a new piece of binding international law with the highest levels of
transparency and full complementarity with existing UN activities in the
conventional arms field must not be wasted.
