by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Throughout Monday afternoon’s meeting on implementation
and Tuesday morning’s meeting on the preamble
and principles of the future arms
trade treaty (ATT), tensions between what are perceived as “state”
interests and “humanitarian” interests remained high. This tension needs to be
dismantled. The UN Charter outlines the rights and obligations of member
states, but it does so in order to prevent armed conflict and protect humans
from the consequences of conflict and violence. This primary objective must be
the ultimate guiding principle during negotiation and implementation of an ATT.
What does this mean in practice?
For the preamble it means emphasizing the consequences of
the poorly regulated arms trade in all its aspects—consequences for
gender-based and sexual violence; human rights; international humanitarian law;
socioeconomic development; peace, security, and stability; criminal activities;
foreign occupation; overproduction of and excessive spending on arms; etc. It
means resolving to address these
consequences by providing assistance to victims and survivors. It means
resolving to prevent these
consequences by effectively regulating the international trade in arms and recalling
that the fundamental way to do so is through the “establishment and maintenance
of international peace and security with the least diversion of armaments of
the world’s human and economic resources,” as spelled out in article 26 of the
UN Charter.
In the principles section it means reiterating the “purposes
and principles enshrined in the UN Charter,” without selectively pulling out
specific ones that promote “national security” of states over human and
collective security. It certainly does not mean creating new rights, such as a
specific right to manufacture weapons. It also does not mean addressing issues
related to civilian ownership of firearms—as Ecuador’s delegation pointed out,
it is generally illegal for civilians to own firearms in Ecuador, therefore,
recognizing the rights of civilians as such would go against that country’s
national laws! This is an inappropriate use of a treaty intended to regulate international transfers of arms.
Of course, it also important to be clear that while the
preamble and principles should help with interpreting the treaty, they do not
establish common international standards for the arms trade themselves.
Therefore, this section must be matched by comprehensive criteria (see, e.g., the editorials from No.
10 and No.
8) and a robust scope (see, e.g., the editorials from No.
9 and No.
7).
Achieving the fundamental goals of the ATT also means the
treaty will need strong, clear, and effective implementation mechanisms. Unfortunately,
the draft
text on implementation does not yet meet this requirement. It suggests
notification of export authorizations to relevant transit and transshipment
states would be voluntary when it should be mandatory. It indicates that
contractual obligations to sell arms would supersede the ATT when clearly the
ATT should take precedence. It suggests actions states “may” take on brokering,
when such actions should be mandatory. In general, it is vague on binding
language. If adopted as written, the implementation section would undermine the
treaty’s objectives.
There is little time
left to iron out these problems in the various drafts, but doing just that
should be the goal of all participating negotiators. Ghana’s delegation noted
on 17 July, the ATT “is not just one of those instruments”—it is not
specifically or only a humanitarian treaty, a disarmament treaty, nor a trade
treaty. “It stands on its own,” the Ghanaian representative said. The only
standard “is what the ATT will do for the world.” This standard must not be the promotion of
the rights of states over the rights of human beings, but rather, the promotion
of the fact that protecting the rights, life, and dignity of human beings will
lead to strengthening of security.
