by Katherine Prizeman, Global Action to Prevent War
As noted by the delegate of New
Zealand on Thursday morning, success for the arms trade treaty (ATT) means
the adoption of standards “high enough for it to be realistic to expect the treaty
to contribute meaningfully to global
peace, security, and stability” (emphasis added). Ambassador Dell Higgie noted that in setting
an obligation for states to conduct a “risk assessment” before authorizing any
export of arms, the ATT must codify circumstances when states should decline
arms transfers. These circumstances include situations where arms are likely to
provoke or exacerbate regional conflict, contribute to economic or social
destabilization, or be used by criminal elements or terrorists. Codifying
circumstances that would require the denial of arms transfers, in addition
those already required under international law such as arms embargoes, is
essential such that the legal framework provided for in the ATT will have a
meaningful, measurable impact on international peace and security.
The idea that an ATT’s success depends on
how it “meaningfully” contributes to global peace and security is a critical
one. Regulating the arms trade through a written list of items to ‘bear in
mind’ when conducting arms transfers is not enough—it is essential that the ATT
does more than improve the regulation
of the international trade in conventional, but that it also reduces and
prevents diversion of arms into the illicit market and prevents irresponsible
transfers that contribute to armed conflict and violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. This was
noted by the delegation of Costa
Rica, which explicitly underscored the importance of the ATT as more than a
tool to be used to facilitate procedural authorizations of arms transfers.
As evidenced by the statements from the
delegations of Nicaragua
and Malaysia,
there are some states that are skeptical of, if not opposed to, an ATT that
goes beyond general norm- and standard-setting and attempts to control the
trade in conventional weapons by codifying criteria that are, in their view,
“immeasurable and broad in nature”. During his opening address as President of
the Conference, Ambassador Moritán made clear that there is a stark difference between
regulation and control, noting that the ATT seeks the former and not the
latter. While it is true that implementation of the ATT will be dependent on
national authorities and their “assessment” of any respective transfer,
over-compensating for fears of states needing to cede their control over the
arms trade by weakening the language around the treaty’s criteria can impede
the ATT's ability to contribute
meaningfully to global peace and stability.
The most
recent Chair’s paper issued on 3 July demonstrates the need to close
loopholes in “state assessment” of transfers, which will determine how
successful the ATT ultimately will be. The paper notes, “Where substantial
risks exist, there shall be an overriding presumption against authorization.”
This is substantially weaker than the previous
version of the Chair’s paper from July 2011 that notes, “States shall not”
authorize transfers when such risks exist. It is also unclear precisely what
“presumption” refers to, leaving room for various interpretations and a further
lack of clarity in setting the terms to regulate the international trade in
conventional arms.
Therefore, navigating the line between states
parties’ right to assess transfers and some external mechanism associated with
“control” has become a major concern for delegations. While the challenge of
verification and oversight continues to be divisive, it is essential that some
level of accountability exists beyond requiring states to conduct entirely
private “assessments”. As noted by the delegation of Malaysia,
confidence-building measures (CBMs) provide for verification and assessment
through record-keeping, transparency, and reporting, although these are not the
only tools available. The representative of CARICOM
called for an ambitious proposal for an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) with
“some measure of scrutiny by an independent body founded in the agreement and
funded by States Parties.” Endowing an ISU with the ability to receive and
verify reports from states parties on the implementation of their treaty
obligations would contribute greatly to strengthening the treaty. Including
provisions and mechanisms that would strengthen the ability of states to carry
out sound and consistent assessments based on verifiable information is an
essential step in this strengthening.
