by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Friday’s
meetings marked the first concrete negotiations of the arms trade treaty (ATT)
process. In the open meetings on scope, delegates had before them a draft
text put together by Ambassador IJssel of the Netherlands, the Chair of
Main Committee II. While the draft text was intended to be a step beyond the President’s
3 July 2012 paper in synthesizing states’ views, and while the negotiations
were supposed to advance the process even further, by the end of the day the
waters were as muddy as ever. Many delegations felt the scope was too broad and
comprehensive while others felt it was too limited. Two issues proved
particularly contentious: limiting the inclusion of small arms to those
intended “for military use”, and deciding whether states should be able to come
up with their own unique control lists. The resolution of both issues will have
serious implications for the ability of the treaty to achieve its goals and
must thus be resolved in a manner that gives highest priority to reducing human
suffering.
Thus far, the
insistence of a few delegations that the ATT not “interfere” with domestic
possession or sale of firearms—most vocally Canada and the United States—has
not seriously affected the development of this treaty. From the first UN
General Assembly resolution in 2006 that kicked-off the process, no
government has tried to argue that the treaty will address anything other than
international transfers of arms. But during Friday’s meetings on scope, the unwarranted
concerns that the treaty might do otherwise made it difficult to move forward
constructively.
This misguided
emphasis on “inference” with domestic issues meant that in the Chair’s draft
text, the item on small arms and light weapons specifies “small arms for
military use”. As many delegations pointed out, this is not an actual category
of weapon. Small arms and light weapons are clearly defined in the International
Tracing Instrument as any “man-portable lethal weapon that expels or
launches … a shot, bullet or other projectile by the action of an explosive.”
The only type of weapon the definition specifically excludes is antique
weapons.
All small
arms, regardless of their intended use, can be used to commit violations of
human rights an IHL, acts of gender-based or sexual violence, or actions that
undermine peace and security. Excluding any type of small arm because it was
not specifically “designated” for “military” use is to undermine the core
objective of the treaty: to reduce human suffering. Thus the vast majority of negotiators
insisted this qualifying language be removed from the text and that no other
such attempts be made to artificially limit the types of small arms included in
the treaty.
The second,
related, issue is that of national control lists. The Chair’s draft text says
that state parties “shall establish, maintain, and publish a control list that
shall include as a minimum the items that fall within the scope of this Treaty.
The definitions of the items on the control list shall be the prerogative of
states parties.”
There seemed
to be a great deal of confusion about the nature of such a control list. Some
delegations interpreted this as meaning that governments would be able to
establish lists that had at least the weapons covered in the treaty but that it
could include additional weapons if they wished. Others thought it was to allow
flexibility so that importing countries could leave off weapons if they don’t regularly import them. Others still
objected to the phrase “as a minimum,” arguing that the treaty will cover what
it covers and that should be the extent of any control list.
There was an
even wider gulf over the issue of definitions, with a clear division between
those who want the treaty to define weapons and those who think there is not
enough time in these negotiations to do so. The question of definitions is an
important one. Until recently, most delegations seem to assume that the
categories of the UN
Register on Conventional Weapons would constitute a base for this treaty.
Yet on Friday many delegations pointed out the problems of relying on the
Register’s categories and definitions. For example, the Swedish delegation
explained that the Register is limited to major combat systems, which, if used,
would unproductively limit the scope of the ATT. Others argued the Register
definitions should not be used because it is a voluntary, not legally-binding,
mechanism.
Again, this issue must be
resolved with a view to minimizing human suffering. Constituting the treaty’s
scope as the minimum requirement, and
having clear definitions for these weapons within the treaty text, would ensure
that everyone is working off the same page. However, if delegations choose to
stick with the current formula, they will need to develop much clearly language
to avoid misinterpretation and to ensure that, as the treaty’s draft
anti-circumvention clause states, all measures are taken to ensure that the
goals and objectives of the treaty are not undermined.
