by Maj Rørdam Nielsen and Dr. Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War
The statement presented at the
ATT negotiating conference by the Egyptian Ambassador last Thursday was
obscured a bit by participation issues centered on Palestine and the Holy
See. But it raised important questions that deserve more attention from
diplomats and commentators, including the following: “Will the outcome tilt the balance further in favor
of major arms producers at the expense of importing states by giving them added
tools to further consolidate their practices in the context of exiting export
control regimes, often seen as discriminatory and often politicized?”
The solution to this ‘politicization’
of arms transfer policy, according to the Egyptian delegation, is to provide
importers with a “phased appeal mechanism against political abuse”.
It is not clear from the
statement itself what Egypt specifically has in mind. Clearly Egypt (and other
states) are concerned that the ATT is in danger of becoming an ‘exporters’
treaty’ (all of the prohibitions listed in the Chair's paper, for instance, are
geared towards exporting states) with few responsibilities accruing to
importing states, but with even less text that underscores the capability of
non-producing states to purchase weapons free of ‘political’ considerations by
the exporting powers. This for some states would include the decision by
exporting states to unilaterally deny transfers based on the belief that the
proposed importers should instead put their limited funds into social
development.
There is at this point a clear
imbalance in the treaty language, focusing primarily on the responsibilities of
weapons producing states to create national laws to ensure that transferred
weapons are not diverted into criminality or used to abuse human rights. Importing
states have their own responsibilities as well such as timely reporting on
transfers and designating national focal points. They might also be
reasonably required to create legal structures that can guarantee only
authorized use of imported weapons as well as mechanisms for punishing those
who pervert such use. But the importing states do not possess the capacity
to guarantee their own ‘security’ through locally produced armaments. In this
sense, they are dependent on unilateral decisions by exporting states regarding
their 'fitness' to receive arms.
It seems unreasonable that major
arms producers would ever agree to a treaty that required them to sell weapons
to states whose policies are inconsistent with their own national
interests. There is no presumption to sell. However,
non-discriminatory transactions are a fundamental aspect of commerce in many of
the major arms producing states. In the US, for instance, we don’t check
religious or political identification in the supermarket check-out line before
allowing customers to swipe their credit card. If upholding the right of
legitimate self defense is as inalienable for importing states as exporting
ones, then it seems reasonable that access to the weapons that ostensibly (if
erroneously in our view) guarantee that security be somehow recognized.
Should the treaty negotiators
take up the question of how a state not under an embargo or threatening mass
atrocities can promote its security when some or all major arms exporters
threaten to refuse them sale? The legitimate threat of diversion would
hopefully be sufficient to deny sale, but what if a ‘finding’ of diversion is
politically motivated rather than based on relevant data? Should there be
no recourse for states facing such discrimination at the point of sale?
As an organization that is
committed to reducing levels of armament and spending on armaments, Global
Action to Prevent War is very uneasy about advocating for some version of the
Egyptian proposal for an 'appeal mechanism' to facilitate arms flows to
non-producing states. We know that many states have been wary of supporting an
ISU with independent authority to ‘flag’ transfers with high diversion
potential, and they would surely be uneasy as well with a proposal to invest
the ISU with the authority to determine and highlight a ‘political motive’ for
denying a particular arms transfer. However, such a denial would seem to
be ‘out of line’ with the underlying national security logic governing so much
of the ATT discussion, though clearly this is not as critical matter as
approving a transfer into an environment where diversion potential was known to
be high.
However, the consequences of
un-remediated politicization of transfers might be more serious still: a
robust and renewed interest in the weapons ‘black market;’ a commitment to
capture and renovate a portion of the millions of illicit weapons in
circulation worldwide; or even efforts to create national weapons
industries or legalize ‘cottage’ industries that produce weapons from
parts. The politicization of weapon sales could lead to a proliferation of
arms industries and pursuits that would create new headaches for both treaty
implementation and regional/sub-regional peace and security. If weapons are
'necessary' for national security, a contention we do not support but that many
states do, then states will find ways to get those weapons, legitimately or
illegitimately, treaty or no treaty. We must not clumsily provide incentives
for states to take their business outside of more formal, transparent options.
Part of the reason that NGOs and
many states push for humanitarian dimensions to this treaty is that we need to
avoid immersion in discussions focused only on the security implications of
transfers and not also on the insecurity implications. Amidst the robust
assertions of national interest, we must be reminded of the wide-scale violence
and social insecurity that transferred weapons—licit and illicit—make
possible. If the ATT process is not designed to scale back or even
eliminate such weapons—and sadly it seems unlikely to be so designed—a final
treaty must at least be fair in its application in order to win broad
support. Failure to at least attempt to accommodate the security interests
of importing states (and de-politicized transfers would appear to be relevant
here) might inadvertently complicate other UN-backed efforts to eliminate
existing stockpiles of illicit weapons, curb street-level violence (especially
against women), secure borders, inspect harbors, spread dependable technologies
for marking and tracing small arms and light weapons, and address a range of
other critical security concerns.
